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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S OBLIGATION TO SERVE




Religious freedom was so important to the founders of our nation
that they enshrined the right to free exercise in the First Amendment of
the Constitution. Today, in the minds of most Americans, this freedom
allows their religious beliefs to inform the decisions and actions of every-
day life, particularly when they believe strongly in the Christian obliga-
tion to be a Good Samaritan. So it is alarming to think that, despite this
basic and most sacred right, actions based on religious convictions have
the prospect of creating criminal liability. But that is precisely the risk
that the Catholic Church is facing with state illegal immigration laws
that seek to criminalize the most minimal efforts of providing basic ser-
vices in the disadvantaged immigrant communities of America. These
laws place the Catholic Church in a position that forces a decision
between serving the stranger and complying with the restrictive laws of a
state.
In late 2005, the House of Representatives passed bill H.R. 4437 in
response to the growing population of undocumented immigrants.' The
bill, if enacted, would have required checking the immigration status of
people seeking services from charitable organizations and churches, and
would have, potentially, made criminals of the people that served
undocumented immigrants.2 Cardinal Roger Mahony3 opposed the
mandate of H.R. 4437 and wrote an open letter to President George W.
Bush explaining that the Catholic Church would not, and could not,
verify legal status before serving people in need.4 Cardinal Mahony
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A. University of
Notre Dame, 2003.
1. Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
2. See id. § 202; see also Letter from Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los
Angeles, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.archdiocese.la/news/pdf/news-704_President%2OBush%20Letter.pdf.
3. Cardinal Roger Mahony's pastoral work has focused on the immigrant commu-
nity since he was ordained a priest in 1962. Cardinal Mahony is a leader in the Hispanic
community and an outspoken supporter of immigrant rights. His call to disobey H.R.
4437 to follow a "higher law" was the inspiration for this Note.
4. See Letter from Cardinal Roger Mahony to President George W. Bush, supra
note 2, at 1. The terms "Catholic Church" and "Church" in this Note refer to the
292 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23
explained that the bill would make churches "quasi-immigration enforce-
ment officials" when the only "underlying basis for our service to others,
especially the poor, is the example, words, and actions of Jesus Christ in
the Gospels."
5
In his letter to President Bush, Cardinal Mahony also declared that
the restrictions of H.R. 4437 on service to immigrants would be "impos-
sible to comply with."" Not only would the restrictions be a logistical
nightmare, they would severely threaten the Church's ability to provide a
variety of services to immigrant communities. Then, in his 2006 Lenten
message to the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Cardinal Mahony pro-
nounced an express directive that allowed, and encouraged, priests in the
Archdiocese to disobey the proposed law.7 His words were a call for civil
disobedience that hundreds of religious leaders around the country
would answer.8 The directive was moot, however, when H.R. 4437
failed to pass the Senate. 9
Congress since has been unsuccessful in adopting comprehensive
reform to solve the growing problem of illegal immigration, bringing the
issue of immigration to the forefront of national attention and stirring
the passion of the American electorate. The federal government's failures
combined with Americans' calls for immigration reform have resulted in
dozens of proposed laws in state legislatures that criminalize conduct "in
furtherance of the illegal presence" of immigrants.'" In the State of
Oklahoma, one such proposal succeeded with the adoption of the
Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, which makes it
a felony "to transport, move, or attempt to transport," or "conceal, har-
bor, or shelter from detection" an undocumented immigrant."' Many
states are following Oklahoma's example. 2
These state proposals raise, once more, Cardinal Mahony's call for
civil disobedience in the face of criminal liability when serving immigrant
hierarchy, priests, and lay faithful of the Roman Catholic Church-though the issues
raised affect all religious organizations.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Editorial, The Gospel vs. H.R. 4437, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A22,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/O3/O3/opinion/O3fri1.html.
8. See The New Sanctuary Movement, Why Now?, http://www.newsanctuary
movement.org/why-now.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2008).
9. See GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation), H.R. 4437-109th Congress
(2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl]09-4437 (last visited Dec. 23,
2008). The Senate Judiciary Committee received H.R. 4437 after it passed in the House
of Representatives but did not act on it before the end of the session, effectively clearing it
from the books.
10. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446(A) (West 2007).
11. Id. § 446(A)-(B).
12. E.g., Alabama, Florida, Missouri, and Rhode Island. This Note will focus on
the proposed laws of these states because they have enacted Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Acts which will be discussed in Part III.
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communities. These state proposals are so far-reaching that they would
criminalize the basic services that many churches offer, such as shelters
and transportation for religious services. So in light of the potential
criminalization of basic services offered by the Catholic Church, religious
and lay faithful must heed Cardinal Mahony's original directive and the
Catholic Church's teaching, and join the call for civil disobedience in
defiance of state illegal immigration laws. As Catholic teaching makes
clear, the Church owes its duty to a higher law in welcoming and caring
for immigrants; Cardinal Mahony's call for solidarity with immigrants
thus lays the foundation for the Catholic Church to declare its commit-
ment to the protection of immigrants and to their pastoral care regardless
of the consequences of restrictive state laws.
Fortunately, the Catholic Church may resort to legal exemptions
from potential criminal liability under state illegal immigration statutes,
and not rely simply on civil disobedience to carry out its mission. The
Church may either seek a constitutional exemption from the laws under
the Free Exercise Clause or seek an exemption in states with Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts. The Catholic Church can avoid criminal lia-
bility by proving that the states lack a compelling interest in burdening
the services the Church offers when fulfilling its obligation to serve the
stranger.
Part I of this Note will explore the basis of the Catholic Church's
obligation to serve immigrants and why this obligation supersedes the
Church's duty to obey the law of a state. Part II will then discuss states'
illegal immigration laws as a response to the federal government's failure
to enact comprehensive reform and how these laws are a threat to the
Catholic Church. Part III will then analyze viable legal solutions that the
Catholic Church may seek under the Free Exercise Clause of the Consti-
tution and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts of particular
states.
I. THE OBLIGATION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
TowARD IMMIGRANTS
Jesus told His disciples that the Kingdom of Heaven was prepared
for those that fed the hungry, gave drink to the thirsty, clothed the
naked, and welcomed the stranger. 13 This message of service became the
mission of the Church when Jesus directed His apostles to "make disci-
ples of all nations . . . teaching them to observe all that [He had] com-
manded."' 4 The Catholic Church, as the keeper of this message, has the
obligation of teaching this message and of providing for the people of
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Catholic Church, this obligation toward immigrants supersedes any obli-
gation to the state.
A. Christ the Foreigner and the Mission of His Pilgrim Church
From Mary's pilgrimage to Bethlehem for His birth to His glorious
entrance into Jerusalem for His death, Jesus was a migrant. Shortly after
His birth in Bethlehem, Jesus left for Egypt to return years later to Naza-
reth in Galilee; 15 the native of Judea would be called a Nazorean. 16 Jesus
then left His home in Nazareth to preach the Good News to those
beyond Galilee and the Jordan River;' 7 Jesus traveled from town to town
proclaiming the Word of God and revealing the Kingdom of Heaven
with "nowhere to rest His head."'" Jesus understood what it meant to be
a stranger in a foreign land and He made sure that His Church recog-
nized the plight of migrants and the need to serve them. His message is
clear: "'What you did not do for one of these least ones, you did not do
for [God].' And these will go off to eternal punishment, but the right-
eous to eternal life." 19
The Early Church made sure that Christians understood Christ's
message to care for one another and to welcome the stranger for the
greater glory of God. From the time of Moses, God had commanded
Israel to treat the alien in its midst "no differently than the natives;" God
asked His people to "have the same love for [the alien] as for [them-
selves]; for [they] too were once aliens."2 The Fathers of the Church
continued emphasizing the importance of being open to strangers by ask-
ing Christians for their hospitality and even for their support of a stran-
ger's journey.2 ' In spreading the message of Christ, the Church also
made sure that Christians understood that they must act in accordance
with His message, for "faith of itself, if it does not have works, is dead."2 2
The Church's teaching makes clear that to answer Christ's call to holi-
ness2 3 all Christians must welcome and serve each other.
Jesus called for a world without differences, where all are united in
Him.24 It is with this vision that the Fathers of the Church asked Chris-
15. Id. 2:13-14, 19-23.
16. Id 2:23.
17. Id. 4:23-25.
18. Id. 8:20; see also id. 9:35; Luke 13:22.
19. Matthew 25:45-46. Cf Luke 9:48 ("Whoever receives this child in My name
receives Me, and whoever receives Me receives Him who sent Me.").
20. Leviticus 19:34; see Exodus 22:21-24.
21. See 1 Peter 4:9; 3 John 1:5-6.
22. James 2:17.
23. See Matthew 20:4 ("You too go into my vineyard."); see also POPE JOHN PAUL
II, CHRISTIFIDELES LAIci (1988) (ruminating on the passage).
24. See Ephesians 2:13 ("But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have
become near by the blood of Christ.").
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tians to look past differences25 and to welcome each other so that people
from around the world can "recline at table in the kingdom of God."
26
Service to immigrants, regardless of who they are and what their legal
status is, is part of Jesus Christ's mission for the Church and its faithful.
B. Understanding Christ's Directive to Serve the Stranger?7
Understanding Jesus Christ's directive to serve the stranger, on
August 1, 1952 Pope Pius XII promulgated the apostolic constitution
Exsul Familia Nazarethana to give guidance to the Church on the pas-
toral concerns of the increasing migrant populations in the world. 8
Through this magna carta on migration, Pope Pius XII noted that "the
Church had to look after [refugees and migrants] with special care and
unremitting aid."29 Exsul Familia Nazarethana also provides an account
of the Church's activities throughout history to carry out its sacred min-
istry to the stranger; in fact, Pope Pius XII says that "there never has been
a period during which the Church has not been active in behalf of
migrants, exiles and refugees."'30 Pope Pius XII's words trace the mission
of the Church toward immigrants and show that "Holy Mother Church,
impelled by her ardent love of souls[,] has striven to fulfill the duties
inherent in her mandate of salvation for all mankind, a mandate
entrusted to her by Christ."
31
Following Exsul Familia Nazarethana, Pope Paul VI continued to
guide the Church on the issue of migration through the Instruction De
Pastorali Migratorum Cura.3 2 The Instruction centered its message on
the respect due migrants and the unfortunate rejection of migrants by
host societies as it provided more concrete instructions on the pastoral
duties for their care.3 3 The Pope made clear that the belief in the One
Body required action from the Church and not passive bystanders. 34 In
1970, Pope Paul VI continued the Church's commitment to serving the
stranger by establishing the Pontifical Commission for the Pastoral Care
25. See Colossians 3:11.
26. Luke 13:29.
27. See PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE PASTORAL CARE OF MIGRANTS AND ITIN-
ERANT PEOPLE, ERGA MIGRANTES CARITAS CHRISTI para. 27 (2004) [hereinafter ERGA
MIGRArrEs] ("[A] careful study of the documents and directives on migration so far
issued by the Church clearly brings to light certain important theological and pastoral
findings that have been acquired.... These documents also illustrate the pastoral dimen-
sion of work for migrants.").
28. See POPE Pius XII, EXSUL FAMILI NAZARETHANA (1952).
29. Id. para. 3.
30. Id. para. 18.
31. Id. para. 5.
32. CONGREGATION FOR BISHOPS, DE PASTORALI MIGRATORUM CuRA (NEMO
EST) (1969).
33. See generally id.
34. See generally PoPE PAUL VI, PASTORALIS MIGRATORUM CURA (1969).
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of Migration and Tourism, which was entrusted with overseeing the pro-
gress of Bishops' Conferences in their pastoral care programs for
migrants.
35
In 1989, the Pontifical Commission for the Pastoral Care of Migra-
tion and Tourism became the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Care of
Migrants and Itinerant People under Pope John Paul 11.36 The re-organ-
ized Council reflected Pope John Paul the Great's 37 keen awareness and
understanding of Christ's message of serving the stranger, and, in 2004,
with the approval and leadership of John Paul the Great, the Council
issued the Instruction Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi.38 Through this
Instruction, the Pope and the Council sought to underscore the growing
problem of migration and to remind the Church and its faithful of its
obligation to act in service of migrants.
39
The Instruction Erga Migrantes puts Pope Pius XII's words in the
context of the modern world and more clearly defines the mission of the
Church to live out Christ's directive to serve the stranger. In Erga
Migrantes the Church points to the increasing displacement of people
around the world due to war and poverty, and states that "today's situa-
tion thus requires ... of the Church, loving attention to 'people on the
move' and to their need for solidarity and fellowship."4 ° The Instruction
recalls the teachings of the Church in its early years, reminding Chris-
tians that they should make no distinction between peoples of different
nations and that "a sense for hospitality [should be] natural to them."'"
In Erga Migrantes, the Church insists that Christians promote a "culture
of welcome," 2 that Christians "[w]elcome one another then, as Christ
welcomed [all], for the glory of God."
4 3
Based on God's directive to the early Church, the Catholic Church
and its Magisterium ask for signs of fraternity and the practice of solidar-
ity "in response to the emergencies that come with migrations: canteens,
dormitories, clinics, economic aid, reception centres." 44 According to
the Church, Christians should make every effort to help migrants toward
35. Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, The
Instruction Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi: A Response of the Church to the Migration Phe-
nomenon Today para. 8 (People on the Move, No. 97, Apr. 2005).
36. Id.
37. I join many Church leaders, theologians, academics, and lay faithful through-
out the world in recognizing the great legacy of the servant of God, Pope John Paul II.
38. ERGA MIGRANTES, supra note 27.
39. See generally id. The Instruction also provides juridical pastoral regulations for
the Conferences of Bishops around the world.
40. Id. para. 11.
41. Id. para. 16.
42. Id. para. 39.
43. Id. para. 40 (quoting Romans 15:7).
44. ERGA MIGRANTES, supra note 27, para. 43.
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integration and self-sufficiency.4 5 Specifically, the Church points to a
particular commitment to "family unification, education of children,
housing, work, associations, promotion of civil rights and migrants' vari-
ous ways of participation in their host society."' 46 The Church teaches
that it is the responsibility of Christians to help their brothers and sisters
in Christ to live life to the fullest.
The Catholic Church's teachings and guidance on the issue of
migration have also been codified in the Codex Juris Canonici. The
Codex is the code of governing law for the Church and its faithful, and
the obligations delineated by the canons in the Codex bind all baptized
Catholics of the age of reason.4 7 Two canons are of particular impor-
tance to the pastoral care of migrants: the first, Canon 529, directs parish
priests to "seek out . . . those exiled from their country, and similarly
those weighed down by special difficulties;"" and the second, Canon
568, asks dioceses, whenever possible, to appoint chaplains to care for
those who "are not able to avail themselves of the ordinary care of pastors
because of the condition of their lives, such as migrants." 9 Furthermore,
in Canon 222, the Codex obliges the lay faithful to assist with what is
necessary for the "works of the apostolate and of charity;" the lay faithful
"are also obliged to promote social justice and, mindful of the precept of
the Lord, to assist the poor from their own resources."' 50 The canonical
norms in the Codex of the Catholic Church delineate the requirements of
fulfilling the Word of God and being a part of the Body of Christ; the
canonical norms simply codify the teachings of Jesus Christ and the gui-
dance of the Catholic Church. Thus, the Church and the lay faithful
have an obligation to care for their migrant brothers and sisters.
C. Executing Christ's Directive to Serve the Stranger in the
United States
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops is committed to
following the Church's Magisterium and has made sure that the Church
in the United States understands the problem of migration through the
lens of faith and in the context of the American problem of illegal immi-
gration.51 To this end, on January 22, 2003, the U.S. Conference of
45. Id
46. Id.
47. See 1983 CODE cc.11, 12.
48. Id. c.529, § 1.
49. Id. c.568.
50. Id. c.222; see also id. c.225 (binding the Christian faithful to make "known
and accepted" the Gospel and bear witness).
51. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has responded to the direc-
tives of the Catholic Church's Magisterium and established the Committee on Migration
and the office of Migration and Refugee Services, which assist parishes across the nation
in their pastoral needs for the care and service of migrants. See U.S. Conf. of Cath.
2009)
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Catholic Bishops joined the Conference of the Mexican Episcopate to
issue a pastoral letter concerning migration, titled Strangers No Longer:
Together on the Journey of Hope.5 2 In this letter, the Bishops gave the
Church pastoral instruction on the care of immigrants in the United
States by reflecting on the "mysterious presence of the crucified and risen
Lord in the person of the migrant."
53
Through this joint pastoral letter, the Bishops urged the Church
and the lay faithful to listen carefully to Christ's call and to recognize the
dignity of migrants. The Bishops' analysis of Catholic teaching points to
five emerging principles which should guide the Church:
1. PERSONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIND OPPORTUNITIES IN THEIR
HOMELAND.
2. PERSONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE TO SUPPORT THEM-
SELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES.
The Church recognizes that all the goods of the earth belong to all
people. When persons cannot find employment in their country
of origin to support themselves and their families, they have a
right to find work elsewhere in order to survive. Sovereign nations
should provide ways to accommodate this right.
3. SOVEREIGN NATIONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONTROL THEIR
BORDERS.
4. REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS SHOULD BE AFFORDED
PROTECTION.
5. THE HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF UNDOCU-
MENTED MIGRANTS SHOULD BE RESPECTED.
Regardless of their legal status, migrants, like all persons, possess
inherent human dignity that should be respected. Often they are
subject to punitive laws and harsh treatment .. . .Government
policies that respect the basic human rights of the undocumented
are necessary.
54
Though the Bishops recognize the sovereignty of states in control-
ling migration, they are clear in stating that the right of sovereignty is not
absolute. 
5
Bishops, A Brief History of Migration and Refugee Services, http://www.usccb.org/mrs-
history.shtml (last visited Dec. 23, 2008).
52. CONFERENCIA DEL EPISCOPADO MEXICANO & U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISH-
OPS, STRANGERS No LONGER: TOGETHER ON THE JOURNEY OF HOPE (Jan. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.usccb.org/mrs/stranger.shtml [hereinafter STRANGERS No
LONGER].
53. Id. para. 3.
54. Id. paras. 34-38.
55. See id. para. 39.
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The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishopsand the Conference of
the Mexican Episcopate also acknowledged the Church's responsibility to
build a "culture of welcome" and to promote a spirit of hospitality.5 6 For
that reason, they declared:
* We call upon pastors and lay leaders to ensure support for
migrant and immigrant families.
• We urge communities to offer migrant families hospitality, not
hostility, along their journey.
• We commend church communities that have established
migrant shelters that provide appropriate pastoral and social
services to migrants.
* We encourage Catholics and all people of good will to work
with the community to address the causes of undocumented
migration and to protect the human rights of all migrants.
• We call on the local church to help newcomers integrate in
ways that are respectful, that celebrate their cultures, and that
are responsive to their social needs, leading to a mutual enrich-
ment of the local church.
• We ask that special attention be given to migrant and immi-
grant children and youth as they straddle two cultures, espe-
cially to give them opportunities for leadership and service in
the community and to encourage vocations among them.
* The Church on both sides of the border must dedicate
resources to provide pastoral care for migrants who are
detained or incarcerated. The presence of the Church within
detention facilities and jails is an essential way of addressing
the human rights violations that migrants may face when they
are apprehended.
• We encourage local dioceses to sponsor pertinent social ser-
vices for migrants and immigrants, particularly affordable legal
services.
• In many rural dioceses, the primary site of pastoral outreach
for farm workers is the migrant camp, usually at a significant
distance from the parish church. In this context we encourage
local parishioners to be prepared as home missionaries and the
migrants themselves to be prepared as catechists and outreach
workers.
57
The Bishops were clear in what was expected of the Church and its
members in dealing with the difficult issue of migration, especially with
the growing problem of illegal immigration in the United States. The
Bishops' message is a call for action, as informed by the religious tradi-
tion of the Church.
56. Cf ERGA MIGRANTES, supra note 27, para. 39.
57. STRANGERS No LONGER, supra note 52, para. 42.
2009]
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Throughout the centuries the Church has remained true to Christ's
directive to serve the stranger, and its leaders have made every effort to
"[k]eep watch over . . . the whole flock of which the Holy Spirit ha[d]
appointed [them] overseers."5 8 As followers of Christ and in commu-
nion with the Church, Catholic leaders and lay faithful must place their
duties to the Body of Christ above all else as directed by Jesus and the
Church. As Pope John Paul the Great said,
In the Church no one is a stranger, and the Church is not foreign
to anyone, anywhere. As a sacrament of unity and thus a sign and
a binding force for the whole human race, the Church is the place
where illegal immigrants are also recognized and accepted as
brothers and sisters. It is the task of the various Dioceses actively
to ensure that these people, who are obliged to live outside the
safety net of civil society, may find a sense of brotherhood in the
Christian Community. Solidarity means taking responsibility for
those in trouble.
59
The Church in the United States must show solidarity and fulfill its
obligation to Christ and His people by serving immigrants regardless of
their legal status and in spite of the threat of criminal prosecution.
60
II. FAILED IMMIGRATION REFORM AND THE STATES'
(THREATENING) RESPONSE
Considering the Christian obligation to serve the migrant, it is of
no surprise that many religious leaders were concerned with the success
of the Sensenbrenner-King Bill, H.R. 4437, which would criminalize
many types of assistance to undocumented immigrants.61 Among those
leaders is Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles, who pro-
tested H.R. 4 4 37's seeming threat to criminalize the services offered by
the Catholic Church in immigrant communities. Cardinal Mahony
called for solutions that focused on the plight of immigrants instead of
laws that dehumanized the illegal immigration problem and created
58. Acts 20:28.
59. POPE JOHN PAUL II, MESSAGE FOR WORLD MIGRATION DAY, 1996 para. 5
(July 25, 1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-
ii/messages/migration/documents/hf.jp-ii-mes-25071995_undocumented-migrants-en.
html.
60. The Catholic Church's belief in the message of Christ is intricately connected
with the actions of service threatened by the state illegal immigration statutes, and "[the]
Court is not empowered to question the validity of that belief." Keeler v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D. Md. 1996).
61. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act,
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 202 (2005).
THE OBLIGATION TO SERVE THE STRANGER
greater criminal liability.6 2 Cardinal Mahony's stance stirred religious
leaders and civil rights activists into joining their voices in support of
undocumented immigrants, and, on March 27, 2006, many of these
leaders came together to lobby Congress for a more compassionate immi-
gration reform.63 Though Congress failed to meet their demands, it did
reject H.R. 4437.64 At the very least, the religious leadership and immi-
grant advocacy groups in America had succeeded in making immigration
a political priority in the United States.6 5
In the summer of 2007 Congress finally heeded the call to take on
the issue of immigration and began debating legislation for comprehen-
sive reform; however, after months of partisan wrangling, Congress
failed.66 Many were disheartened, but Congress' failure was especially
poignant as state officials sought stricter laws against those that, seem-
ingly, propagated the illegal immigration problem by hiring undocu-
mented immigrants.6 7 To these state officials, the failure of Congress and
the beginning of the presidential election process meant that the problem
of illegal immigration would be shelved indefinitely, so various state leg-
islators undertook the issue of immigration and began looking for
solutions.
One of the states that dealt with the issue of immigration directly
was Oklahoma. Even before Congress' squabble with comprehensive
immigration reform, the State of Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Tax-
payer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, which states, in part:
(A) It shall be unlawful for any person to transport, move, or
attempt to transport in the State of Oklahoma any alien knowing
or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has come to,
62. See Cardinal Roger Mahony, There is a Higher Law: Welcome the Stranger,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 22, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/
22/opinion/edmahony.php.
63. See The New Sanctuary Movement, supra note 8.
64. See GovTrack.us, supra note 9.
65. Across America, millions took to the streets demanding that undocumented
immigrants be able to adjust their immigration status and that they be treated with dig-
nity and respect. The chorus of these protests recalled the immigrant heritage of the
United States and pointed to the importance of the labor that undocumented immigrants
provide the country. In the spring of 2006 immigration advocacy groups and civil rights
leaders even called for a boycott, asking all immigrants to stop working for a day and
asking advocates and supporters not to buy American products that same day. For over a
year the issue of immigration rattled Americans who awaited the leadership of the federal
government to take action. See, e.g., Shannon D. Harrington, U.S. Immigration Protests
Fill Streets, Seek Reforms, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 10, 2006, http:llwww.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=aB3uFOy5. Hfs (reporting on the April 10 rallies, the
date with the largest turnout nationwide).
66. See Associated Press, States Pick up Where Congress Left off of Immigration Law,
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entered, or remained in the United States in violation of law, in
furtherance of the illegal presence of the alien in the United States.
(B) It shall be unlawful for any person to conceal, harbor, or shel-
ter from detection any alien in any place within the State of
Oklahoma, including any building or means of transportation,
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has come
to, entered, or remained in the United States in violation of law.
(C) Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to prohibit or
restrict the provision of any state or local public benefit described
in 8 U.S.C., Section 1621(b), or regulated public health services
provided by a private charity using private funds.
(D) Any person violating the provisions of subsections A or B of
this section shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony punisha-
ble by imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Correc-
tions for not less than one (1) year, or by a fine of not less than
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
68
The statute, the first of its kind among the states, has two key
aspects: 1) the criminalization of transporting, harboring, or sheltering an
undocumented immigrant, and 2) the exemption of general and emer-
gency health care providers from criminal liability. Oklahoma's two
main provisions are included in the proposals of at least four other states
that are considering illegal immigration statutes as a result of Congress'
failure to take decisive action against illegal immigration.
69
However, as well-intentioned as these states may be in trying to
address the concerns of illegal immigration, the state illegal immigration
statutes present serious obstacles for the Catholic Church's mission of
service to immigrant communities. These statutes are a threat to church
communities in the states because of the far-reaching implications of
their language. The Catholic Church in Oklahoma has already expressed
its concerns because of the apparent restrictions on the assistance it pro-
68. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446 (West 2007); cf H.R. 4437, 109th Cong.
202 (2005) (detailing similar criminal prohibitions).
69. See S.B. 225, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2008); S.B. 77, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ala. 2008); H.B. 73, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008); H.B. 1346, 94th Gen. Assem.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.B. 5367, 2007 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2007). This
Note will focus on Alabama, Florida, Missouri and Rhode Island, in addition to
Oklahoma, because these are the only states where the Church may seek exemptions from
illegal immigration laws under the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts these states have
enacted; see infra Part III.B.
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vides to immigrants, 7° concerns that are similar to those voiced by Cardi-
nal Mahony after the passage of H.R. 4437.71
On its face, a state illegal immigration statute would criminalize the
transportation of undocumented immigrants to participate in church ser-
vices or to seek medical and legal services; it would criminalize giving an
undocumented immigrant an opportunity to sleep in a church shelter;
and it would criminalize allowing undocumented immigrants to gather
in a building to receive food, water, clothing, or medical or legal ser-
vices. 72 Any of these services could fall under the definitions of "trans-
portation," "harboring," or "sheltering;" and the churches' activities
could be seen as furthering the immigrants' "illegal presence" because the
services provided would facilitate their continued presence in the United
States.73 The churches would also satisfy the illegal immigration statute's
"reckless disregard" element because they provide public services without
regard for the legal status of the people they serve-especially when
churches provide services to Spanish-speaking persons that would likely
be undocumented in certain communities. 74 The broad language of the
state illegal immigration statutes criminalizes "treating undocumented
migrants with the same humanity and generosity offered to others,
[because] the activities not only provide material assistance but engender
70. Greg Horton, Could State Immigration Law Send Church Workers to Jail?,
SOONER CATH., May 27, 2007, at 1. Many dioceses across the country should share the
concern of the Diocese of Oklahoma City. Some of the services dioceses offer extend
beyond the provision of food, clothing, and shelter. Many times parishes or community
centers run by the diocese may offer free legal services and free transportation for people
that require medical services. Most parishes across the nation also raise St. Vincent de
Paul funds that are disbursed at the discretion of the parish for things such as electricity
bills, prescription medication, and even rent. All these services are provided under the
Church's obligation to serve and could, potentially, expose priests and volunteers to crim-
inal liability under state illegal immigration statutes.
71. See text accompanying notes 2-7 supra.
72. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; cf Allen Thomas O'Rourke,
Note, Good Samaritans, Beware: The Sensenbrenner-King Bill and Assistance to Undocu-
mentedMigrants, 9 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 195, 201-02 (2006).
73. See supra note 69; cf O'Rourke, supra note 72, at 203 ("Given the words'
ordinary meanings, [H.R. 4437's] most reasonable interpretation suggests that critics are
correct in alleging that House Bill 4437 prohibits altruistic and non-discrimination-based
assistance to undocumented migrants. Activities designed to improve someone's health
or living conditions clearly amount to assistance and doubtless increase that person's
ability and desire to remain in the United States.").
74. More than 50% of people in Spanish-speaking communities are undocu-
mented immigrants. This increases the possibility of catering to undocumented immi-
grants in Spanish-speaking communities, which, in turn, increases the possibility of
acting with "reckless disregard" under the law. See Jeffrey S. Passel, Pew Hispanic Ctr.,
Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population 2 (Mar. 21, 2005),
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf.
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an atmosphere of social acceptance and fellowship that encourages or
enables undocumented migrants to remain in the United States."
75
Some may argue that the state illegal immigration statutes would
not target churches and religious organizations even though the language
of the law seems to apply to the services a church may offer to the immi-
grant communities. Oklahoma State Representative Randy Terrill, who
drafted the Oklahoma illegal immigration statute, explained that the stat-
ute targeted employers that hired undocumented immigrants and agen-
cies that used taxpayer money to provide "education, health care, housing
and basic subsistence" to undocumented immigrants.76 Representative
Terrill stated that few organizations would be affected by the law because
of the limited scope of the statute, and that church organizations, like
Catholic Charities, would only be among those targeted by the statute if
they received taxpayer funds.77 But, while he addressed the intent of the
statute's scope, Representative Terrill did not address the problem of the
statute's language, which does not specify that criminal liability attaches
to a church or religious organization only when taxpayer funds are used
in "furtherance of the illegal presence" of immigrants. In fact, the statute
only exempts health care and emergency service providers from criminal
liability, no one else. 78 The scope of the statute's language is not narrow,
but, rather, quite broad;79 the statute leaves churches, priests, and lay
faithful vulnerable to the whims of state governments.
State laws that mirror Oklahoma's illegal immigration law would
allow the prosecution of men and women that provide the services facili-
tated by the Catholic Church for immigrant communities. Though it
may be reasonable for states to enact legislation in response to the per-.
ceived encouragement or inducement of illegal immigration, the legisla-
tion must not prohibit the services of the Catholic Church and its Good
Samaritans. Legislation that has the potential of criminalizing the Cath-
olic Church's obligations to serve the people of God regardless of their
immigration status creates a religious hardship that cannot, and should
not, be constitutional.
III. SOLUTIONS FOR THE CHURCH UNDER RESTRICTIVE STATE
IMMIGRATION LAWS
It is unsettling to believe that the Catholic Church may be crimi-
nally liable for following the Word of God and serving the stranger.
However, even with the prospect of criminal prosecution, the Catholic
Church must remain true to the message of God and serve the needs of
75. O'Rourke, supra note 72, at 203.
76. Horton, supra note 70.
77. Id.
78. See infia notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
79. Cf O'Rourke, supra note 72, at 204.
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the immigrant communities in America. But civil disobedience is not
the only solution to the conflict between the Church's obligation to
immigrants and the state illegal immigration laws. The Catholic Church
can avail itself of two viable legal solutions under the restrictive regula-
tory schemes of state illegal immigration statutes: 1) to seek a constitu-
tional exemption from the laws under the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution, or 2) to seek an exemption from the laws under the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Acts of particular states. Either solution will
protect the Catholic Church when providing basic services to undocu-
mented immigrants.
A. Free Exercise of Religion Exemptions Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits govern-
ment from regulating the free exercise of religion.8" The Supreme Court
has held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment affords an
absolute protection of religious opinions and prohibits government legis-
lation from targeting particular religious creeds.81 This absolute protec-
tion, however, does not apply to religious conduct.82 Nonetheless, the
Court has recognized that conduct and belief may be intricately con-
nected and has "rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is
always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause."'8 3 The recog-
nition of this connection is particularly important in the Catholic tradi-
tion because the Church considers "[the protection of conduct . . .
essential to the religious adherent since a religious faith not expressed in
conduct would be regarded as inauthentic."
84
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in free-exercise
claims looked at whether state laws burdened the exercise of religion
under a strict scrutiny standard. The Court's test for free-exercise chal-
lenges hinged on the "compelling state interest in the regulation" that
"substantial[ly]" infringed a claimant's free exercise of religion; 5 the gov-
ernment had to prove that there were "no alternative forms of regulation"
and that it had an interest in regulating a subject within its power.
86 If
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
81. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (recognizing that
the freedom of belief is "absolute"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("The
door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation
of religious beliefs as such.").
82. See generally United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (recognizing the
distinction between belief and conduct).
83. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972).
84. Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom to be a Church: Confronting
Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy, 3 GEo. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 387, 399 n.75
(2005) (citingJames 2:14-17 ("What good is it... if someone says he has faith but does
not have works? .. .[F]aith of itself, if it does not have works, is dead.")).
85. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
86. Id. at 407.
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the government failed to meet this standard, the Court would find a
constitutional exemption to the challenged law.8 7 This strict scrutiny
standard balanced the interests of the government and the claimant to
protect conduct that was informed by a particular religious belief, such as
the Amish belief that compulsory attendance at a public high school
would endanger the salvation of their children.8 8 However, the Supreme
Court seemed to move away from this approach to free-exercise claims.
In 1990, the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith made a marked departure from a century of First Amendment
jurisprudence89 by holding that a "generally applicable" law did not vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause when its "incidental effect" burdens the free
exercise of religion.9" The Court's reasoning explained that religious
conduct had been exempted under the "compelling interest" test in the
past only because other constitutional rights were at stake. 9 1 Thus, the
Court set aside the strict scrutiny standard of the "compelling interest"
test for free-exercise claims and, instead, established a rule that upholds
laws that are "neutral" and "generally applicable" even if they burden the
free exercise of religion. 92
The Court clarified Smith in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah93 and made clear that it was not overruling the "compel-
ling interest" standard that had been used in prior free-exercise deci-
sions. 94 The Court established that the analysis of free-exercise claims
required that a lawfirst be examined under a neutral and general applica-
bility test and then, if the law failed, that a compelling government inter-
est be shown by the state.95 The Court used this approach for the first
87. The Court's jurisprudence grants an exemption of applicability to the claim-
ant instead of striking down the law as unconstitutional. See Fraternal Order of Police v.
City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 361 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 220 (1972)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999).
88. See generally Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
89. See Michelle L. Stuart, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993:
Restoring Religious Freedom After the Destruction of the Free Exercise Clause, 20 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 383, 398 n.98 (1994) (citing Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990)).
90. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
91. Justice Antonin Scalia, speaking for the Court, explained that the only time
the Court actually applied a "compelling interest" test was in the context of unemploy-
ment benefits, which was the issue in Sherbert. Scalia went on to say that the other
decisions, purportedly, applied a "compelling interest" test when the case involved
another constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or association. Scalia continued
by listing, at length, decisions that denied exemptions based on a free-exercise claim
alone. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-88; see also Stuart, supra note 89, at 401.
92. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
93. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
94. Id. at 531-32.
95. Id.
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time in Lukumi and provided (limited) guidance for lower courts in
examining future free-exercise claims.
Lukumi helps to explain Smith's neutrality requirement by looking
at several factors. First, the Court requires that a challenged law, at a
minimum, be nondiscriminatory on its face; that is, that the law not
"refer[] to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible
from the language or context." 96 Second, the Court looks at the effects
of the law and its objective to make sure that it does not target a religious
practice-though the Court states, "To be sure, adverse impact will not
always lead to a finding of impermissible targeting."97 Finally, the Court
considers whether the objective of the law could have been achieved
through narrower regulation.98 If a law fails to be neutral, then it fails
the Smith test and requires a compelling government interest.99 How-
ever, if a law is found to be neutral under a free-exercise claim, the Court
asks that a law be generally applicable.' 0
Lukumi gave an insight into what the "generally applicable" require-
ment meant, although it sidestepped the opportunity to provide a spe-
cific definition or factors to consider and, instead, limited itself to
finding that the ordinances at issue fell below the minimum standard of
the Free Exercise Clause.i ° ' The Court's apparent focus was on the
underinclusiveness of the ordinances in Lukumi, stating that they did not
advance or accomplish the interests they set out to achieve.' 0 2  In
Lukumi, the Court seems to say that "[a] law that is underinclusive in the
sense of failing to restrict certain 'nonreligious conduct that endangers'
state interests, 'in a similar or greater degree' than the restricted religious
conduct[,] is not generally applicable, at least when the 'underinclusion is
substantial, not inconsequential.' 1 03 Beyond this, Lukumi does not give
courts much guidance on what the general applicability requirement
means under the Free Exercise Clause. It is clear, however, that if a court
finds that the challenged law fails the general applicability requirement,
the government must prove, under the pre-Smith strict scrutiny standard,
that there is a compelling state interest to protect."14
So how do Smith and Lukumi affect a possible free-exercise chal-
lenge of state illegal immigration laws? Cases in the lower courts and the
96. Id. at 533.
97. Id. at 535.
98. See id. at 539.
99. See id. at 531-32.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 543.
102. Id.
103. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 867
(2001) (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543).
104. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32.
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analysis of the current free-exercise jurisprudence point to the possibility
of a constitutional exemption for the Catholic Church and the services it
offers.1 °5 Though at first glance the Supreme Court seems to have raised
the bar to the success of a free-exercise claim, lower court decisions sug-
gest that when a law has a secular exemption-and is, thus, not generally
applicable-then a claimant can receive a religious exemption.' °6 This
reasoning is based on the view that the courts will "ensur[e] religion
equal status with any protected interest . .. preserv[ing] considerable
room for religious liberty within an 'equal treatment' approach."'0 7 A
court could create a religious exemption when the law is underinclusive
and "fails to pursue [its intended] interest against other conduct that
causes similar damage to that government interest."' It is in the cate-
gorical exemptions of state illegal immigration laws that the Catholic
Church can seek a religious exemption from potential criminal liability
when it serves undocumented immigrants.
Three particular cases following Lukumi highlight the possibility of
religious exemptions when challenged laws have secular exemptions. The
first is Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, where the court held that the sys-
tem of exemptions created by the city's zoning laws required that the city
government assert a compelling interest against the demolition of a
monastery. 0 9 The second is Rader v. Johnston, where the court held that
a university's requirement of on-campus residency was not generally
applicable when the "system of 'individualized government assessment[s]'
of... students' requests for exemptions" allowed for exceptions." 0 The
third is Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, where the court held
that the police department could not treat religious exemptions to its
"no-beard" policy any differently than medical exemptions.1 11
The courts in these cases allowed a religious exemption to different
situations based on Smith and Lukumi, noting that "in circumstances in
which individualized exemptions from a general requirement are availa-
ble, the government may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
religious hardship without compelling reason." '' l 2 The state's laws or
requirements in these cases allowed for individualized, secular exemp-
105. See generally Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F.
Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
106. See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16
J.L. & RELIGION 187, 194 (2001).
107. Id. at 195.
108. Duncan, supra note 103, at 868.
109. 940 F. Supp. at 885.
110. 924 F. Supp. at 1553 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
111. 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cit. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999).
112. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986))) (internal quotations omitted). All three courts cited to
this passage in support of their decision.
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tions, 113  contravening the general applicability requirement under
Smith.'14 This allowed the courts to look at the interest of the state in
regulating the conduct at issue, 1 5 and, ultimately, to find that the rea-
sons in all three instances were not compelling enough to tolerate a bur-
den on the religious practice of the claimants." 6
The Catholic Church should follow the example of the claimants in
Keeler, Rader, and Fraternal Order of Police, and challenge state illegal
immigration laws to receive a religious exemption. The state illegal
immigration statutes that threaten the Catholic Church with criminal
liability are similar to the regulatory schemes in Keeler, Rader, and Frater-
nal Order of Police in that they create a secular exception from criminal
liability and are, thus, not generally applicable. 17 Under the Smith/
Lukumi standard, the states would then have to show a compelling inter-
est in regulating services the Catholic Church provides to undocumented
immigrants; the states would fail and would be required to grant a relig-
ious exemption.
113. It is important to note Judge, now Justice, Samuel Alito's response to the
argument that a medical exemption was not an individualized exemption:
While the Supreme Court did speak in terms of "individualized exemptions" in
Smith and Lukumi, it is clear from those decisions that the Court's concern was
the prospect of the government's deciding that secular motivations are more
important than religious motivations. If anything, this concern is only further
implicated when the government does not merely create a mechanism for indi-
vidualized exemptions, but instead, actually creates a categorical exemption for
individuals with a secular objection but not for individuals with a religious
objection.
Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 365 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542). See also supra
notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
114. See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1552 n.23 ("[C]ourts and commentators generally
agree that a pattern of individualized exemptions undercuts applicability of the broad
[general applicability] rule in Smith.") (citations omitted). The "individualized exemp-
tions" in these cases included limited exceptions to an on-campus residency requirement,
circumstances that suspend a zoning commission's obligation to reject a demolition, and
a medical exemption from a police department's "no-beard" policy. See generally Keeler,
940 F. Supp. 879; Rader, 924 F. Supp. 1540; Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d 359.
115. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32.
116. In these cases the interests the courts found non-compelling were historic
preservation, required on-campus residency for college freshmen, and uniformity of
appearance. See generally Keeler, 940 F. Supp. 879; Rader, 924 F. Supp. 1540; Fraternal
Order of Police, 170 F.3d 359.
117. This Note focuses on the general applicability requirement of Smith and not
the neutrality requirement because, considering the factors outlined in Lukumi (see supra
notes 96-100 and accompanying text), the only argument bearing on the neutrality of
state illegal immigration statutes is that they could be more narrowly tailored; this argu-
ment is more appropriately discussed in terms of general applicability. See Lukumi, 508
U.S. at 531 ("Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to
satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.").
2009]
310 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23
State illegal immigration laws".. have in common the exception
from criminal liability found in subsection (C) of Oklahoma's illegal
immigration statute: "Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to
prohibit or restrict the provision of any state or local public benefit
described in 8 U.S.C., Section 1621(b), or regulated public health ser-
vices provided by a private charity using private funds."' 19 This language
allows the government to exempt benefits provided by the state or local
governments that may breach the prohibitions of the statutes, such as
health care services, emergency medical services, emergency disaster
relief, and other services "necessary for the protection of life and
safety." 121 In the state illegal immigration statutes "individualized
exemptions from a general requirement are available, [thus] the govern-
ment may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship
without compelling reason.
" 12 1
In failing the general applicability requirement of SmithlLukumi,
the states must then show a compelling reason for the hardship the Cath-
olic Church may suffer as a result of the illegal immigration statutes.
122
The states would fail to show such compelling interest for two reasons.
First, there is no compelling reason in prohibiting the Catholic Church
from offering the same type of services that state and local governments
118. See S.B. 225, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2008); S.B. 77, 2008 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ala. 2008); H.B. 73, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008); H.B. 1346, 94th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.B. 5367, 2007 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2007).
This Note analyzes the proposed legislation in these states as if they were enacted.
119. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446(C) (West 2007).
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2000). Note that 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b)(4)(A) exempts
services "deliver[ed] in-kind ... through public or private nonprofit agencies" at the
discretion of the Attorney General of the United States. It is unclear if the state illegal
immigration laws adopt this exemption by citing to the federal statute and if they would
follow an exemption granted by the Attorney General to, in this instance, the services
provided by the Catholic Church. The language of the state illegal immigration statutes
only mentions public benefits and indicates that the only private service exempted would
be from a charity that uses private funds to provide health services; this interpretation of
the statute would seem to exclude services from private organizations such as the Catholic
Church. Senators in the South Carolina General Assembly recognized the need for
explicit exemptions for churches or religious institutions and included explicit language to
that effect in their proposed illegal immigration statute. See S.B. 392, 117th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. § 9(E) (S.C. 2007). The unanswered questions and potential crim-
inal liabilities that state illegal immigration statutes present make the challenge of these
laws an even more pressing issue.
121. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986))) (internal quotations omitted); see Rader, 924 F. Supp.
at 1552 n.23.
122. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32. The claimant need not show that the
burden was substantial. See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1555 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at
544-46); see also Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 979 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that
a claimant only needs "a sufficient interest in the case to meet the normal requirement of
constitutional standing").
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may provide. The Catholic Church may point to the common interest
shared between the Church and state governments in protecting life
regardless of legal status-as is evident in the exemption of private health
care agencies from criminal liability;1 23 where the Church shares in the
interest of the government for the care of any resident, the state cannot
show a compelling reason to legislate against it. A state cannot prohibit,
and cannot show that there's a compelling interest in prohibiting, the
care of people in need when the states themselves have shown an interest
in the care of their residents through unemployment benefits, health care
assistance, and other social programs. Secondly, the state would be hard-
pressed in proving a compelling reason to legislate on the issue of immi-
gration when it is an area preempted by the federal government. 124 Con-
sidering that the federal government has so dominated the field of
immigration, the states' interest in regulating illegal immigration cannot
be compelling; the failure of Congress to enact comprehensive immigra-
tion reform cannot excuse invading an area of federal regulation.
The courts should find a constitutional exemption to apply to the
Catholic Church's services to undocumented immigrants because the ser-
vices it offers are like those that state and local governments provide.
The exemptions should protect priests and lay faithful from criminal lia-
bility when they provide shelter to undocumented immigrants and when
they offer transportation to religious and legal services. The noble cause
of helping the stranger and the interest in serving a community in need
should drive the challenge of state illegal immigration laws; the statutes
that criminalize the efforts of people impelled by the religious belief to
serve the stranger cannot stand against the Catholic Church when they
contravene the state's own interest to protect life and assure the most
basic necessities of our society: food, water, shelter, religious opportuni-
ties, and access to legal counsel.
12 5
B. Free Exercise Exemptions Under State Constitutions and SRFRAs
In 1993, after the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, Congress
enacted and the President signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
123. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446(C) (West 2007).
124. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[An] Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.")
(citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)). The Catholic Church may seek relief
from criminal liability under state illegal immigration laws by raising a preemption chal-
lenge; this Note does not explore this solution for the Church because its focus is on
solutions that affirm the connection between religious conduct and belief. For an inter-
esting discussion of federalism, field preemption, and immigration, see Peter H. Schuck,
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 57 (2007).
125. See Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 884 ("[The] Court is not empowered to question
the validity of [the Church's] belief.").
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("RFRA"). The RFRA required that courts, in a free-exercise claim,
examine a state's law under a compelling interest test and not the neutral
and general applicability test of Employment Division v. Smith.26 By giv-
ing the courts the discretion to evaluate free-exercise claims under a strict
scrutiny standard, Congress reversed what many thought was the eviscer-
ating effect of Smith on the Free Exercise Clause's protection of religious
conduct.'2 7 However, when the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
review the RFRA in City ofBoerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress
had exceeded its power in rewriting rather than enforcing the protections
of the Free Exercise Clause;12 8 the Court held that Congress had imper-
missibly imposed on the states the weighing of the interests of an individ-
ual's religious faith against the citizenry's general interests.' 2 9 The Court
concluded that in a free-exercise claim it is "[the] Court's precedent, not
RFRA, which must control."
130
The Supreme Court's decision was disappointing to those that
looked for greater protection of religious conduct after Smith, so state
legislators considered their own solution to protect the free exercise of
religion: State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts ("SRFRAs"). While
Smith remains the basis of free-exercise jurisprudence under the federal
Constitution, many states have rejected the Supreme Court's decision
and have enacted SRFRAs to require their own legislature to prove a
compelling governmental interest when burdening the exercise of religion
within each state.
131
The SRFRAs codify the compelling interest standard and allow state
courts to interpret the right to free exercise of religion under their own
state constitutions; the SRFRAs would then allow states to find more
expansive protections of religious conduct. Scholars argue that SRFRAs
may help states "interpret state religion clauses in ways that bring into
the twenty-first century the principle that government has a limited
126. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (2007). The RFRA read:
(a) Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmen-
tal interest.
127. See Eric A. Shumsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Postmortem of a
Failed Statute, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 81, 85-86 (1999).
128. See 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
129. See id. at 534.
130. Id. at 536.
131. See Berg, supra note 106, at 203.
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interest in constraining religious freedom. 1 3 2 The SRFRAs can provide
states the opportunity of "retaining [the compelling state interest] analy-
sis that was discarded by the Supreme Court" in Smith. 13 3 The scope of
the states' protection of informed religious conduct must then be
examined under the free exercise clause of each state's constitution. The
analysis requires a close look at the text of these clauses because most
states have not interpreted the free exercise rights in their
constitutions. 134
Of the states that have enacted SRFRAs, Alabama, Florida, Mis-
souri, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island 13 5 have also enacted or are currently
considering state illegal immigration statutes. 136 Considering the consti-
tutions of these states and the mandates of their SRFRAs, the Catholic
Church may seek exemptions from criminal liability under the states'
illegal immigration laws. Through the particular language in state con-
stitutions and SRFRAs, or merely the willingness of the state courts, the
Catholic Church may find a legal solution that does not hold it crimi-
nally liable for serving the stranger.
137
The constitutions of Florida, Missouri, and Rhode Island have spe-
cific provisos that may be interpreted as restricting the burdens on free
exercise of religion only to situations affecting public morals, peace,
safety, or the rights of others.' 38 This is a more expansive view of the
132. Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around- The New Relevancy
of State Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 353, 367 (2004).
133. Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under
State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 747, 773 (1993). Only the supreme courts of Oregon and Vermont have chosen to
adhere to the Smith standard. See Durham, supra note 132, at 370 n.122.
134. Parsell, supra note 133, at 765; see also Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers,
Religious Free Exercise Under State Constitutions, 34 J. CHURCH & STATE 303, 310
(1992). Of the states discussed in this Note, Florida is the only state that has had an
opportunity to consider its SRFRA. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
135. See ALA. CONST., amend. 622; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2008); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 1.302 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 253 (West 2008); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 42-80.1-3 (2007); cf Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 126.
136. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446(C) (West 2007); S.B. 225, 2008 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2008); S.B. 77, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2008); H.B. 73, 2008 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008); H.B. 1346, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.B.
5367, 2007 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2007).
137. See Durham, supra note 132, at 369
[Sitates have been willing to depart from federal law in deciding religious estab-
lishment issues in some cases because of the specificity of their texts. Giving
similar effect to free exercise protections may help to create a more coherent,
text-based jurisprudence .... State constitutions, with their very specific textual
commands, can perhaps provide better navigation in the murky waters that
engulf religious establishment and free exercise claims.
(footnotes omitted).
138. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 5; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3;
see also Durham, supra note 132, at 367.
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freedom of religion found in the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion, 39 and allows laws, such as the SRFRA, to require that the state
define the interests it regulates under these terms when the regulation
burdens a citizen's religious conduct. 14 1 Under the SRFRAs of Flor-
ida,' 4 1 Missouri, and Rhode Island, the Catholic Church can raise a chal-
lenge to state illegal immigration laws because they burden the Church's
exercise of religion by restricting the services it provides according to the
message of God-substantially burdening142 services that protect life and
provide for the poor, and that provide important contributions to soci-
ety. Under a state free-exercise claim the state courts must then follow
the SRFRAs and their constitutions, requiring that the state illegal immi-
gration laws have an interest in regulating public morals, peace, safety, or
the rights of others. 143 The states would fail to show that such interest
exists. The state courts should find that the interest in regulating illegal
immigration, whether to protect the economy or prevent illegal immigra-
tion, is not compelling enough to burden the Catholic Church's service
to immigrant communities.' 44 Where the Church shares in the interest
of the government for the care of any resident, the state cannot show a
compelling reason to legislate against it; a state cannot show that there's a
compelling interest in prohibiting the care of people in need when the
states themselves have shown an interest in the care of their residents
through unemployment benefits, health care assistance, and other social
programs.
In Oklahoma the Catholic Church's argument must vary because
the Oklahoma Constitution does not have a proviso similar to those
found in the constitutions of Florida, Missouri, and Rhode Island.
14 5
The only difference, however, is that the Church cannot expect the state
courts to limit the compelling interest under the SRFRA to be defined as
an interest affecting public morals, peace, safety, or the rights of
others.' 4 6 Nonetheless, the Catholic Church would be successful in
showing that the state lacks a compelling interest in burdening the set-
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
140. See Parsell, supra note 133, at 765-66.
141. Florida is the only state discussed in this Note that has considered its SRFRA,
and its Supreme Court has found that the compelling interest standard is permissible in
free-exercise claims and that it requires a substantial burden to be shown by the claimant.
See generally Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 924 So.2d 48 (Fla.
2006), rehearing denied, review denied, 940 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 2006).
142. All SRFRAs define "substantially burden" as "inhibiting or curtailing relig-
iously motivated practice." See supra note 135.
143. SRFRAs vary on the remedies available to the claimant, but they all provide
an affirmative defense or exemption. See supra note 135.
144. See Parsell, supra note 133, at 765-66; cf supra notes 122-24 and accompa-
nying text.
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
146. See OLA. CONST. art I, § 2.
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vice to immigrants because, like those provided by the state, the services
provided by the Church have the purpose to protect life and serve the
poor; furthermore, the Church can show that the state illegal immigra-
tion statutes can be more narrowly defined to achieve their objective of
curtailing illegal immigration without curtailing the services of the
Church. 4 7 In accepting the SRFRA, Oklahoma courts can grant the
Catholic Church exemptions from criminal liability under the state ille-
gal immigration statutes.
A free-exercise claim in the state of Alabama would be an easier
battle for the Catholic Church. The State of Alabama decided to enact a
SRFRA as an amendment to its Constitution, enshrining the compelling
interest standard of review for free-exercise claims. 14 8 The Church in
Alabama must simply point to the burden of the state's illegal immigra-
tion statute and how that burden cannot be upheld when the interest of
the state in regulating illegal immigration is not compelling; when con-
sidering the types of services that the Church offers and that would be
inhibited by the state illegal immigration law, the Alabama courts should
find that they fail the compelling interest test of the Constitution. This
would warrant an exemption from criminal liability.
1 4 9
SRFRAs are a viable, even necessary, alternative to bringing action
against state regulation in federal court. 150  State constitutions and
SRFRAs may provide the Catholic Church exemptions from criminal
liability under state illegal immigration laws so that the Church can con-
tinue to serve the stranger. State courts provide an opportunity to seek
the expansion of the freedom of religion in the context of a particular
state's laws, precedent, and history. In these state constitutions, the
Catholic Church may find a more generous understanding of the free
exercise of religion; seeking this generous construction of religious free-
dom is "faithful to the notion of state constitutions as independent
147. Cf supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. Another issue to consider in
Oklahoma is the possibility that the state courts may align themselves with the Supreme
Court's Smith decision and invalidate the SRFRA because the State Constitution is simi-
lar to the Constitution of the United States. However, some scholars believe that there is
a strong argument in considering the states as greater guarantors of religious freedom,
and, as such, state courts would be persuaded to follow the state legislature's wisdom in
the SRFRAs. See generally Durham, supra note 132; Parsell, supra note 133. Butsee Mary
J. Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 153 (2000) (criticizing RFRAs using state
constitutional principles).
148. ALA. CONST. amend. 622.
149. Cf supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
150. See Durham, supra note 132, at 365-66.
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sources of liberty that in many instances preceded codification of rights
in the federal charter."
15'
CONCLUSION
The Catholic Church, as the keeper of God's message of love and
hope, has an obligation to serve all people, regardless of immigration
status. As Cardinal Roger Mahony stated, the only "underlying basis for
our service to others, especially the poor, is the example, words, and
actions of Jesus Christ in the Gospels." 152 In following Christ's directive
to serve all, including the stranger, the Church must be ready to stand
against the criminalization of the very essence of its existence. Fortu-
nately, in standing against the state's effort to curtail or inhibit its ser-
vices, the Catholic Church can avail itself of the very system that
prosecutes its conduct of love and charity.
The Church must continue its work and seek exemptions from the
restrictive state illegal immigration laws through a free exercise claim
under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or
under the State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts and constitutions of
particular states. The refusal of such exemptions would offend the juris-
prudence of the Free Exercise Clause and the will of the people as
reflected in the actions of legislatures. Above all, the failure to grant the
Catholic Church an exemption for its love and compassion would offend
the Higher Law to which all owe obedience.153
151. Gary S. Gildin, The Sanctity of Religious Liberty of Minority Faiths Under State
Constitutions: Three Hypotheses, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLAss 21, 32
(2006).
152. Letter from Cardinal Roger Mahony to President George W. Bush, supra
note 2, at 1.
153. See Ephesians 2:14-15 ("For He is our peace, He who ... broke down the
dividing wall of enmity, through His flesh, abolishing the law with its commandments
and legal claims.").
